During the fighting in the North Caucasus, several thousand units of various weapons and military equipment were used by the Joint Group of Forces. In particular, armored vehicles were widely employed. The Group of Forces was primarily equipped with T-72, T-62, BMP-1, BMP-2, and various modifications of armored personnel carriers. These vehicles provided effective support to ground forces and were often used for direct fire, including against unarmored targets. The BMP-2's automatic cannon demonstrated particularly high effectiveness in destroying enemy personnel and weapons.

T-72 tanks equipped with dynamic protection have proven to be quite effective. There have been cases of multiple hits (up to 10 hits) by anti-tank grenades. However, the tanks remained combat-ready.

MT-LB tracked multi-purpose light armored tractors were widely used to solve a wide range of combat and transport tasks. The combat capabilities of these vehicles were significantly enhanced by the installation of KPVT machine guns, ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft installations, or AGS-17 grenade launchers, which significantly expanded their ability to engage the enemy. These vehicles proved to be particularly useful in mountainous and forested areas. With their lightweight design and tracked chassis, they were well-suited for traversing rugged terrain and off-road conditions.

To solve the problems of technical and logistical support for the fighting troops, motor vehicles were widely used. The Ural-4320 vehicle demonstrated high operational and transport capabilities in off-road and mountainous conditions. However, the lack of armored protection for the vehicles' cabs and engines led to the breakdown of vehicles and, most unfortunately, to casualties among personnel, especially drivers. In some cases, the supply of ammunition and fuel to combat units was significantly hindered due to intense enemy fire.

In the course of the counter-terrorist operation, the overwhelming majority of small arms, melee weapons, and rocket and artillery weapons showed high reliability and effectiveness. 7.62 mm AKM assault rifle; 7.62 mm SVD sniper rifle; 40 mm GP-25 grenade launcher; 82 mm 2B9 Cornflower and 2B14 Podnos mortars; 122 mm 2S1 Gvozdika and D-30 howitzers; 152 mm 2SZ howitzerAcacia tree"; 120-mm MLRS "Grad"; 220-mm MLRS "Uragan".

However, the implementation of the potential combat capabilities of these models was limited by the insufficient number of these models in the Joint Group of Federal Forces, the low performance of the supporting reconnaissance and surveillance equipment (especially in conditions of limited visibility and at night), and the low efficiency of the automated control systems.

The following main features of the use of RAV samples during a counter-terrorism operation should be noted:

1. The enemy had virtually no heavy artillery or aircraft, so the use of artillery and MLRS was carried out in the absence of fire combat. This must be taken into account when analyzing the effectiveness of the use of heavy artillery and determining its development prospects.

2. In mountainous and forested terrain, artillery firing positions were located in relatively small areas. The personnel of the batteries (especially the command staff) were exposed to enemy snipers from neighboring mountains (highlands). It is clear that in the future, units designed to operate in such conditions will need to have transportable (portable) shelters made of composite materials to protect their gun crews from small arms fire and shell and mine fragments. This is particularly important for towed artillery and mortar crews.

3. Despite the fairly dense and accurate artillery fire, the effectiveness of the available standard shells against protected targets remains insufficient. For example, the suppression (destruction) of engineer-prepared firing points required

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It was a significant waste of ammunition and did not always produce the desired results.

4. Combat operations in mountainous and forested terrain require frequent decentralization of artillery formations. This, in turn, implies a large number of fire control channels, which is not provided by standard communication and control equipment.

Special attention should also be paid to the equipment of artillery fire and air strikes. In this regard, there is still much to be improved and refined. The same applies to the maintenance of weapons during combat operations. The most common issues faced by artillery crews were leaks from the recoil devices of their guns, malfunctions in the electrical systems, and problems with the base chassis.

However, in general, RAV samples showed high reliability.

The issue of providing the required living conditions in the mobile weapons of the Ground Forces remains acute. The high levels of gas contamination in the living compartments during intense firing, the stressful temperature conditions, especially in high-temperature environments, and the lack of basic means of ensuring normal living conditions had a negative impact on the effectiveness of combat use of weapons and equipment, as well as on the well-being and professional performance of the crews (calculations).

The widespread use, especially in populated areas, as well as in operations to free captives and hostages, could find means of non-lethal destruction, which cause the so-called functional destruction of weapons, military equipment and manpower. In this case, special substances, adhesive compounds, foams and other means could be used. As means of delivery of this type of weapon could be used as artillery guns and MLRS, as well as grenade launchers and means of close combat.

The counter-terrorism operation has once again highlighted the problematic issues of the system of command and control of troops and weapons. The degree of equipment of units with automated control means is extremely low, especially with regard to the tactical level of command. In addition, there is a lack of modern radio communication equipment capable of masking speech (especially in motorized rifle battalions). However, such equipment has begun to be supplied to the troops, but the pace and volume of supplies are insignificant. In addition, the radio communication equipment intended for solving control tasks has a number of drawbacks. First of all, these are significant parameters in terms of weight and dimensions, a relatively low capacity of the batteries, especially in low-temperature conditions, and insufficient reliability of their operation in high-humidity conditions.

During the counter-terrorism operation, army aviation was widely used, including Mi-24V(P) transport and combat helicopters and Mi-8T, MT, and MTV transport and assault helicopters.

The quality of combat missions performed by army aviation units was greatly influenced by the physical and geographical conditions of the combat area. The complex high-altitude terrain allowed the enemy to camouflage themselves well and use natural shelters, which significantly reduced the firepower of the helicopters. In the high-altitude and forested areas, which concealed the enemy's air defense systems, the number of combat damage to helicopters from enemy small arms and artillery increased. Often, the performance of combat missions by army aviation was hindered after 2 p.m. due to the need to complete

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flights against the sun. This reduced the effectiveness of fire and forced them to go to the target with a different course, which was under the control of enemy air defense firepower. At the same time, in the morning hours, haze was often observed in the gorges when approaching combat areas, and in the afternoon cumulonimbus clouds developed, and air turbulence increased. For this reason, a significant number of Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters of outdated modifications were unable to effectively perform tasks of hitting ground targets and transporting personnel and cargo in mountainous conditions, especially at temperatures of +30C and higher.

The militants' widespread use of small arms against helicopters forced the crews of Mi-8 helicopters to wear body armor to protect the cabin from the lower and side hemispheres.

The difficult conditions of the mountainous terrain impose great restrictions on the operation of aviation equipment. The operation of engines in combat missions was forced to be carried out at extreme modes, which led to a decrease in their operating life and premature wear.

When helicopters land on unprepared ground sites or in riverbeds (when taking off from these sites), a large number of small stones and sand are thrown into the air, which damage the blades of the main rotor and tail rotor and get into the engines. This leads to rapid wear of the working blades of the engine compressors and reduces their stability against surge, as well as a decrease in power output.

The effectiveness of using combat helicopters during the day corresponded to the tactical and technical characteristics established in the 1970s. The experience of using helicopters in combat in Chechnya shows that the onboard equipment and weapons do not meet modern requirements for the accuracy of helicopter navigation (navigation accuracy, lack of a digital terrain map) and the accuracy of using unguided weapons.

The effectiveness of using helicopters at night was low due to the lack of night vision systems and the use of outdated flight and navigation equipment, which made it difficult to reach the target when there was no visual contact with the target or landmarks on the ground.

During the combat operations, unmanned aerial reconnaissance systems were used. In general, they proved to be highly effective. However, the experience of using the Stroy-P unmanned aerial system in combat showed that it does not fully meet the requirements for accurate coordinate determination and 24-hour operation.

The effectiveness of the army aviation combat use was reduced due to the shortcomings of the control and communication systems. Especially big problems arose when organizing communication with the advanced air navigator.

During the fighting in the Chechen Republic, flamethrowers and incendiary weapons were widely used, as they are indispensable for defeating the enemy in urban areas, as well as incendiary smoke cartridges and hand-held smoke grenades.

The use of RPO-A flamethrowers allowed for the solution of the most difficult fire tasks, especially in cases where the use of conventional small arms was ineffective and the use of artillery was difficult. The successful use of RPO-A flamethrowers to destroy a wide range of targets (light armored vehicles, firing points, groups of militants, and snipers located both openly and in various structures) increased the popularity of this weapon among military commanders with each passing day of the operation.

The effectiveness of flamethrowers was highest in well-trained and prepared units.

During the counter-terrorism operation, combat equipment kits for military personnel from combined arms units and the Airborne Troops were tested in real combat conditions. It is advisable to develop and adopt improved combat equipment kits for military personnel from other specialties, such as snipers, crew members of combat vehicles and support vehicles, spotters, etc., along with improving the equipment for motorized riflemen and paratroopers.

The analysis of armed conflicts in Yugoslavia, Tajikistan, and the North Caucasus demonstrates the need for specialized units that are trained for effective combat operations in the mountains and have specialized mountaineering equipment.

It is necessary to improve the existing means of life support and troop deployment in the field, including, first and foremost, means of water extraction, purification, transportation, and storage, as well as heating systems and autonomous power supply systems.

At present, it is important to conduct a comprehensive, critical, and, most importantly, objective assessment of all the factors that have influenced the quality of preparation and the successful conduct of the counter-terrorism operation in the North Caucasus region. It is necessary to identify the specific and clear problems that arise during the operation and to develop ways and means of solving them.

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