Over its long history, the Main Armored Vehicle Department has undergone more than one reorganization. With the growth of armor and firepower of the army, the names and functions of the central command were imputed, but its priorities remained unchanged: the development and adoption of new types of armored and military vehicles, the organization of their maintenance and repair, storage and logistics.

Today, Colonel - General Sergey Alexandrovich MAYEV, Head of the Russian Armed Forces ' Armament and Military Equipment Operation Department, Head of the Main Armored Vehicle Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, tells about his main command.

Sergey Aleksandrovich Mayev was born on July 13, 1944 in Udmurtia, in the village of loggers of the Grakhovsky district. In 1964 he graduated from the Omsk Tank Technical School.

Passed all positions - from deputy company commander to Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces for armament. He graduated from the Faculty of Senior Engineering staff of the Academy of Armored Forces, the Military Academy of the General Staff. He served as Deputy Army Commander for Armament-Chief of Armament of the 40th Army in the DRA.

Since 1998-Head of Operation of weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation-Head of the Main Armored Vehicle Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

He was awarded the Order" For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR "of the III degree, two Orders of the Red Star, the Order "For Military Merit", the Order" For Services to the Fatherland " of the IV degree.

- No matter how the priorities in the development of weapons and military equipment change in the direction of strategic nuclear forces, high-precision weapons, computer technologies, armored vehicles remain the main component of the weapons system on the battlefield. This means that the importance and place of the Main Armored Vehicle Department in the structure of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation is high. However, few, even from among the military people, have a substantive idea of what GABTU is doing?

- Currently, the Main Armored Vehicle Directorate of the Russian Defense Ministry is the central military management body of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the formation and implementation of a unified military-technical policy in the development of armored weapons and equipment (BTVT) and military automotive equipment (WAT). GABTU organizes tank technical and auto-technical support (TTO and ATO) in the Armed Forces and is responsible for the entire life cycle (from development to decommissioning) of a sample of weapons and military equipment (IWT) according to the fixed nomenclature. The Main Directorate is the general customer and fund holder of BTVT and AT, armored and automobile property (BTI and AI), the central complementing body of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

In October 1998, by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Head of the Main Armored Vehicle Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation was also appointed Head of Operation of weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Introduction of the post of Chief of Operation of weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation is due to the need to coordinate the activities of the military management bodies of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Airborne troops, military districts, fleets, main and central departments of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation on the operation, repair of weapons and military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, organization and improvement technical support systems.

The need to combine these positions is due to the fact that 95 percent of the equipment used is automobile and armored, or mounted on automobile and tracked chassis.

- Sergey Alexandrovich, please explain to the best of your ability the structure and main tasks of GABTU, as well as similar subordinate bodies.

- The structure of the Main Directorate includes the command, headquarters and a number of departments, including operation and combat training, orders and supply of BTVT and AT (BTI and AI), their repair, as well as independent departments, scientific and technical committees and services that have specific tasks or support the activities of the main structural divisions

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GABTU OF the Ministry of Defense OF the Russian Federation. Directly subordinate to the Main Directorate are the corresponding storage bases and warehouses, repair enterprises, research and testing institutions, and military educational institutions.

The tasks of GABTU include the development, ordering, supply, major repairs, modernization, and disposal of equipment for the needs of the Armed Forces, as well as for other troops, military formations, and bodies of the Russian Federation in accordance with the established procedure. The Main Directorate ensures the accumulation and storage of army equipment and property reserves in accordance with the established standards, organizes and directs the training of specialists in armored and automobile services, and performs a number of other functions.

All of the above tasks are solved by the Main Directorate through units, enterprises and institutions of direct subordination, automobile and armored (automobile armored in the Navy, automobile and electric gas in the Air Force) services of the types of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Airborne troops, military districts, which in turn have a vertical structure of the relevant military command bodies, TTO forces and means and the anti-terrorist operation.

- The main directions in the activities of the central command were and still are the development and adoption of new models of armored and automobile equipment, the organization of their maintenance and repair, storage and logistics. Recently, the Military-Technical Council of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation adopted a Concept for the development and improvement of armored weapons and equipment. What is being done in this direction?

- Unfortunately, the real economic situation in Russia forces us to reduce allocations for the production of new BTW models. Therefore, it is necessary to deal more with the modernization of previously released samples, which, as practice shows, is the most effective way to ensure the necessary level of combat capability of troops in conditions of limited funding.

In the light of the Concept of development and improvement of BTVT and AT, its main tasks are: maintaining the combat condition of armored vehicles; conducting a deep modernization, primarily of its latest models, at industrial plants and repair plants (BTRZ); creating a promising domestic tank that surpasses all existing foreign models, and consistently equipping them with units of constant readiness. Important tasks are to improve the mobility characteristics by installing high-power engines and auxiliary power plants to supply the equipment with electricity when the main engine is not working; ensuring compatibility of samples for various purposes in uniform battle formations. A great return is expected to be obtained from the work on improving the BTVT samples during mass production, which will bring their combat characteristics to the level of modern foreign analogues.

- Sergey Alexandrovich, do you think it is possible to compensate for the numerical losses of armored weapons and military equipment that occurred as a result of the reform of the Armed Forces with their new qualitative parameters?

- New, more modern BTW qualities cannot compensate for quantitative losses by themselves. A tank is a rather complex system, and the successful performance of combat missions depends crucially on the level of training of the crew. Let's be objective: today there is a sharp decrease in the volume of training tasks performed (due to a shortage of fuel and lubricants, other logistical problems), even in units of constant readiness. The lack of continuity and shortening of the terms of practical training for gunners and tank commanders (out of 24 months of service, combat training classes account for no more than seven), and a decrease in the general education level of conscripts have a negative impact. But any costs here lead to incomplete implementation of the combat and technical capabilities of weapons and military equipment. Chechnya confirmed the urgent need for installation on vehicles

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blocking and other systems for limiting breakdowns in case of erroneous actions of the crew, increasing its security and explosion and fire safety.

- Combat experience, including during the liquidation of gangs in Chechnya, has shown that the main reasons for the defeat of crews, drivers and cars themselves are weak protection from bullets, fragments of mines and shells, as well as mine explosions. But there are new powerful and protected multi-purpose vehicles, the family of which has already been developed and put into service. But the troops don't have them. Why?

- Yes, indeed, at present, local protection of the crew and vital components (radiators, engine compartments, fuel tanks and tires) has been developed on all brands of vehicles used in areas of possible destruction by enemy fire. There are already wheeled vehicles with special armored cabs and platforms, with armored devices built into the structure to protect the vital elements of cars. Modifications of wheeled vehicles with special frame-panel cabins of increased load-bearing capacity and devices that provide the ability to install removable screens for local armor protection of crews and the most critical structural elements have been created. Work has been done to create removable elements of local armor protection for the crew and critical elements for basic BAT samples made in an unprotected serial version.

Examples of removable local protection are armor protection kits for Ural-4320-10, Ural-4320-31, KamAZ - 4310, ZIL-4334, and UAZ-3151 vehicles, which provide protection for the crew and individual components from 7.62 mm bullets and fragments weighing up to 3.0 g and have shown sufficient reliability. effectiveness during combat operations in Dagestan and Chechnya.

Volumetric armor protection is more acceptable for the hull structures of vehicles, and can also be achieved by creating armored modules (armored cabins, armored compartments, etc.) for modifications of vehicles for various combat uses.

Examples of such developments are the highly mobile GAZ-3937 multi-purpose vehicle, armored cabs for Ural - 5322-21 and Ural-4320-31 vehicles. Unfortunately, new powerful and protected army multi-purpose vehicles, the family of which has already been developed and even put into service, are not yet being delivered to the troops. Only the lack of funding did not allow us to carry out work on receiving design and technological documentation for local armor protection kits for Ural vehicles and establish their mass production. Of course, new equipment is expensive. But the lives of our soldiers and officers have no value, they are priceless.

- The last Chechen campaign showed that GABTU took into account the lessons of Chechnya in 1994-1996. However, the requirements for military equipment, as you know, are constantly increasing. What else is planned to be done to improve the combat properties of armored vehicles?

- After the first Chechen campaign, the GABTU conducted a number of measures to modernize military equipment. The course of hostilities showed that the course was chosen correctly.

First of all, to save the lives of our servicemen, work was carried out to strengthen the security of armored vehicles. Work continues to strengthen the protection of lightly armored armored personnel carriers, IFVs, and MTLBs. Lattice anti-accumulative screens are installed, which make it possible to remove the damaging effects of ATGMs in eight out of ten cases. The MTLB is equipped with a new effective armament - a 30-mm automatic gun.

In Chechnya, T-72 tanks, in particular, have shown high efficiency in their use. Thanks to reliable armor and dynamic protection, they could withstand up to 5 RPG hits, while maintaining combat capability. (In turn, the accuracy of hitting a tank gun at a range of up to 4 kilometers was high). However, we believe that the protection of the tank from anti-tank mines, land mines and sub-caliber shells is still insufficient. Today, the Main Directorate, taking into account the principle of sufficient funding, sees the development of the main combat properties of equipment in its modernization based on unified technical solutions.

- Reduction of the Armed Forces, changes in the groupings of troops (forces) in strategic areas, as well as the development and adoption of the latest means of warfare

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they require clarification and changes in the forms and methods of conducting combat operations. How should these forms and methods change in the context of the implementation of the new Military Doctrine?

- Despite the saturation of the modern battlefield with various combat vehicles, armored weapons and equipment remain the most protected type of weapons, resistant to various damaging factors and capable of performing a wide range of tasks. In recent years, the BTVT and vehicles based on it have formed an interspecific system of operational and tactical weapons that ensures the mobility and stability of ground forces in maneuverable forms of armed struggle. As the analysis of recent local conflicts shows, this system has proved itself and will remain reliable for a long time to come.

- The experience of combat operations in Dagestan and Chechnya, the course of the anti-terrorist campaign revealed the need for a qualitative improvement in the technical support of the troops. What are the main directions for solving this problem?

- Speaking about the experience gained in conducting counter-terrorist operations in Dagestan and Chechnya, it is necessary to take into account the specifics of military operations. A relatively small group of troops (forces) created for the destruction of gangs on the territory of the Republic of Dagestan, the transience of the military operation and the availability of a sufficient number of forces and maintenance facilities in the North Caucasus Military District in general made it possible to meet the needs of active units and divisions in ammunition, military-technical property (VTI) and the restoration of military equipment. The main problems were reduced to the timely provision of troops with material and technical resources. This is primarily the absence of storage bases and warehouses of weapons, ammunition, and military-technical equipment on the territory of the republic, the disparity of the directions of operations of the troops and the difficult terrain conditions. Even such a factor as the weather conditions characteristic of the region often played a negative role in the delivery of ammunition to the troops by air. Experience is taken into account. Already in the course of the counter-terrorist operation in Chechnya, a rear base with the necessary supplies of material and technical means, including ammunition and VTI, was formed in the Caspian direction. In order to speed up the process of returning faulty (damaged) vehicles to service, repair of military equipment on ready-made units was organized. During the entire period of active combat operations, repair teams of specialists from industrial enterprises and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation were involved in performing military repairs of complex weapons and military equipment systems (weapons complexes, optoelectronic equipment, communications equipment, automated control systems, etc.). The solution of many technical support problems that emerged during counter-terrorism operations, after a thorough analysis of their causes and development of areas of activity, has become practical. Such problems include the order of deployment of repair and restoration bodies in the newly created groups of troops, the recruitment of units and units, primarily operating in the first echelons, forces and means of technical support with weapons, military and special equipment. Detailed study and support of other state security agencies requires solving the problem of organizing technical support for groups of troops that, along with formations and units of the Ministry of Defense, include military formations and bodies of other ministries and departments of the Russian Federation. So far, the proposals of the GABTU of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation for completing military repair bodies with highly qualified specialists from among contract servicemen or civilian personnel have not been implemented. Certain organizational and technical difficulties are also present in solving the problem of improving the management of technical support both in the center and in the military level.

Unfortunately, all the unresolved problems require a review of approaches to financing the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. And this is a difficult task, as you know, at the moment.

The conversation was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Oleg SKIRA

From the Orientir dossier

GABTU includes parts of central subordination, universities, training units, research institutes, bases of automobile and armored vehicles, automobile and armored repair plants, and support units. In military districts - bases for the repair and storage of armored and automobile equipment, separate repair and restoration battalions. All this "economy" reliably ensures the daily life of the Armed Forces, their mobilization readiness.

From the Orientir dossier

After the reform in 1995, the Main Armored Department and the Main Automobile Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation were merged into the Main Automobile Armored Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Its head in connection with the creation of the Department of Operation and Repair of Weapons and Military Equipment was also appointed head of operation and repair of military equipment of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Since 1998, GABTU has been assigned additional tasks for organizing the operation and repair of weapons and military equipment, developing and implementing a unified policy in the field of technical support for the Armed Forces.

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