North Caucasus Scientific Center of Higher Education

For the general public in Russia, the events that have developed in Dagestan in recent years have for some time been in the shadow of the Chechen conflict. After it ended, Dagestan was spoken of as a new "powder keg" of the North Caucasus, the explosion of which could have much more serious consequences for Russia than the conflict with Chechnya.

These concerns became particularly acute in early 1998. Information received from Dagestan throughout 1997 noted an increase in the activity of Chechen militants on the administrative border between the two republics: the expansion of the network of terrorist training bases, the transfer of armed formations from the interior of Chechnya to the border, an increase in illegal arms shipments from this republic to the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan, populated mainly by Chechens-Akkinites, political conflicts, and whose leaders dream of reunification with Chechnya. The December 1997 attack on a Russian military unit stationed in Buinaksk summed up the preliminary results of this activity and served as a review of the forces and combat readiness of extremists. The fact that the underground organization Central Front for the Liberation of Dagestan claimed responsibility for this terrorist act, along with the activation of so-called Wahhabis in some regions of the republic, gave the impression that the extremist forces of Chechnya and Dagestan were ready for joint large-scale actions aimed at separating Dagestan from Russia.

Wahhabism is one of the many movements in Islam that advocates a return to the original foundations of the faith, which were distorted during the widespread spread of Islam. It emerged in the middle of the XVIII century under the influence of the preacher Abd-al-Wahhabi. It was brought to the North Caucasus from outside at the beginning of Perestroika. It was actively spread after the entry of Russian troops into Chechnya. The Wahhabis of the North Caucasus are sponsored by Saudi Arabia and have armed detachments led by one of Chechnya's field commanders, Jordanian Khattab, and his supporters. The danger of Wahhabism is determined by its orientation towards participation in political processes and the use of extremist methods to achieve political goals.

The political situation in Dagestan itself did not inspire optimism. In June 1998, the republic had to go through the election of the Chairman of the State Council , the highest executive body. According to available information, M. Magomedov, who held this post, could not count on the broad support of the population of the republic, which created wide opportunities for various clan-mafia groups in the upcoming redistribution of power and spheres of influence in the economy. Some of them were not averse to using forceful methods of pressure on the Constitutional Assembly (the elected body that elects the Chairman of the State Council) in order to achieve a favorable election outcome for "their" people. Intervention in the upcoming events by Chechen militants, who, according to some sources, promised their support to one of Magomedov's main competitors, was not excluded. A demonstration of these capabilities was the hostage-taking of Russian servicemen in the Makhachkala region.

The actions of forceful pressure on the Constitutional Assembly were planned to begin on the very eve of the election of the Chairman of the State Council. However, due to a number of circumstances that thwarted the plans of the extremists, they had to speak earlier. The events of May 20-21, 1998, and the seizure of the State Council, the People's Assembly, and the Government of the Republic of Dagestan were premature, which allowed the authorities to take measures and ensure conditions for holding elections, which were again won by M. Magomedov.

His only competitor in these elections was Sharaputdin Musaev, manager of the Russian Pension fund for the Republic of Dagestan. The personality is quite remarkable. He combined his duties as a government official with the role of the head of the Sharapovskaya criminal group that controlled the city of Kaspiysk. Pensioners in the republic did not receive pensions for months, and Musayev made extensive use of the pension fund to his advantage. On September 30, 1998, the Dagestani Prosecutor's Office issued an arrest warrant for Musaev, accusing him of embezzlement of the fund's funds in the amount of 46 million rubles. At that time, Musayev's whereabouts were not established. Justice had to wait.

In the summer of 1998, explosions occurred once again in Makhachkala - another attempt on the life of the mayor of the capital of Dagestan, S. Amirov. The last of them claimed the lives of many innocent people. On August 21, the most high - profile crime of the year took place-the murder of the Mufti of Dagestan, Saidmukhamed Abubakarov, who strongly opposed the spread of Wahhabism in the North Caucasus, criticized the republic's leadership for impotence in the fight against extremism, criminality, irrepressible embezzlement of state funds and oblivion of the interests of working people. :

The murders of public and political figures, high-ranking government officials, heads of economic structures and enterprises have long earned the republic the infamous reputation of the Russian Republic of Sicily. Powerlessness breeds impunity. Forces interested in the disintegration of the republic, its dismemberment and withdrawal from Russia " are starting to play big. Residents of several villages of the Buinak district, where Wahhabis are influential-Kara-mahi, Chaban-mahi, Kadar-in August declared their territory a zone where only Sharia laws apply, which is tantamount to undermining the constitutional foundations of the republic. On the same days, a part of the population of the cities of Khasavyurt and Kizilyurt held unauthorized rallies, where they expressed disagreement with the results of the election of the Chairman of the State Council of the Republic and showed their intention to march on Makhachkala and block republican roads. Given the almost universal armament of the population, the conflict could easily become bloody. The situation was defused by peaceful means. However, it seemed that the extremists ' plans to create the first non-government-controlled enclaves with a gradual transition to the dismemberment of the republic were beginning to be implemented.

It would be a grave mistake" to assess the reasons for the summer aggravation of the political situation in Dagestan and reduce them exclusively to the subversive activities of forces hostile to the republic. This tension is determined by both long-term and situational factors that reflect the specifics of ethnic, socio-economic and political processes.

It is known how complex the ethnic composition of the republic's population is. Representatives of more than 100 nationalities and nationalities live in a relatively small area, 30 of which are considered indigenous. Some of them are facing problems caused by their separation, while others are trying to restore their ancestral rights to the territory of residence, which were violated during the years of Stalin's deportations and subsequent relocations. Small peoples show dissatisfaction with the lack of representation in the highest authorities of the republic, dissatisfaction with their socio-economic expectations. Such dissatisfaction exists among the overwhelming majority of the population of Dagestan, regardless of ethnicity.

One of the ethnic problems of the republic is Lezgian. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Lezgins (204.4 thousand in Dagestan) were divided between Russia and Azerbaijan. In September 1991, the Congress of plenipotentiaries of the Lezgin people demanded reunification within a single national-state entity - Lezgistan. The situation became more complicated during the Chechen conflict, when measures to tighten the border regime were taken to counter the supply of weapons to militants across the border of Azerbaijan and Dagestan. This was taken advantage of by corrupt officials, criminal structures that levied tribute on Lezgins who crossed the border to maintain ties with their relatives. Thus, a hotbed of ethnopolitical tension was formed in the south of the republic.

After the collapse of the USSR, the problem of the Kvareli-S1K Avars, a small mountain ethnic group that lived on the territory of Georgia and was forcibly displaced from there during the rule of 3. Gamsakhurdia, arose. The Avars were allocated land for settlement in the Nogai steppe, which affects the interests of the Nogai people.

Nogais are another divided people, whose representatives live on the territory of Dagestan, Stavropol Territory and Chechnya. The Nogai Steppe, a territory inhabited by Nogais, was incorporated into the Grozny Region in 1944, created after the deportation of Chechens and Ingush and the abolition of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1957, after the restoration of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the Nogai Steppe was divided between Dagestan, Chechen-Ingushetia, and Stavropol Krai. In 1990, at the third Kurultai of the Nogai people, the Republic was proclaimed (but never established) Nogai Republic in the Russian Federation. In the meantime, the Nogais living in Dagestan, having created their own national movement "Birlik" ("Unity"), insist on the return of those territories that were developed by the Avars and Dargins.

The zone of increased tension is the territory of Dagestan, where Chechen Akkinites live (Khasavyurt and Novolak districts). They were part of the Aukhovsky district, which was liquidated in 1944 and settled by Laks after the deportation of the Akkin Chechens. The authorities of Dagestan attempted to solve this problem by resettling Laks and Avars to lands adjacent to the territories inhabited by Kumyks, which increased the discontent of the latter. The Kumyks at the second Congress of the Kumyk people (November 1990) adopted a Declaration of Self-determination, declaring their autonomy as part of the Russian Federation and Dagestan.

Thus, national movements (Kumyk, Lezgian, Nogai, Chechen-Aukhov) emerged, demanding a revision of the constitutional foundations of the republic, the transformation of Dagestan into a federation of national-state entities. The national movements of the two largest peoples of Dagestan - Avars (496,000) and Dargins (280.4 thousand) - are in favor of preserving the unitary state structure of the republic. The positions of the "federalists" were supported by the Terek Cossack Army. Its leaders put forward demands for the separation of the Cossack regions from the territories of the North Caucasian republics. In Dagestan, this is the Kizlyar district.

The peculiarities of ethnic and political problems in Dagestan led to the fact that the main participants in the political process in the republic were not political parties, but national movements, whose leaders turned them into a means of exerting pressure on the authorities in order to divide spheres of influence in the economy, securing for the most "enterprising" tidbits of former state property subject to privatization. To support their political and economic claims, these movements have created or have a base for creating illegal armed groups that have already been used in conflict situations. Thus, according to Dagestani analysts, in November 1991, during the aggravation of Avar-Kumyk relations, the Avar people's front named after Shamil gathered up to 30 thousand armed Avars, the Kumyks-from 15 to 15 thousand "militias".

Paradoxically, the presence of such formations, while balancing each other, has become one of the factors that ensure relative stability in the republic. Thus, when in May 1998 the Khachilaev brothers, the leaders of the Laks, with the support of their armed supporters, seized government buildings in Makhachkala, armed supporters of the mayor of Makhachkala, S. Amirov, one of the leaders of the Dargins and the leader of the Avar national movement, G. Makhachev, were introduced into the city, which helped stabilize the situation.

However, such mechanisms for maintaining stability are costly for the republic. Weapons are easily used to put pressure on rivals in a political struggle or to redistribute spheres of influence in the economy. This resulted in a pronounced criminalization of the political and economic life of Dagestan. The fact that violence rules the ball in the republic is evidenced by the tragic list (far from complete) of victims of high-profile contract killings. They were: A. Parsukov, M. Suleymanov, T. Toturbiev, S. Gadzhiev, I. Ivanov-deputies of the supreme legislative body of the Republic of Moldova; B. Gadzhiev-former Minister of Trade of the Republic of Moldova; Sh. Zh. - former Head of the Department of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova; A. Bayramov-candidate for Deputy of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation; G. Gamidov-Minister of Finance of the Republic of Moldova; Abubakarov is the mufti of Dagestan. Abduction of heads of rural and district administrations, their children, attempts on law enforcement officers - these and other forms of violence have become one of the important factors that destabilize the situation in the republic. The pressure on the authorities and the degree of penetration of representatives of the criminal community in the republic are unprecedented. According to data published in the Russian press, "the list of persons subject to special protection, who have parliamentary immunity and other privileges granted by joining the government or staying in close proximity to it, coincides by 40 percent with the list of criminal authorities" (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 14, 1998). The current situation reflects the growing power vacuum a legitimate political authority that is unable to ensure law and order in the republic. It is no coincidence that at a meeting of the State Council of the republic, held a few days before the May events in Makhachkala, the former Minister of Internal Affairs of Dagestan M. Abdurazakov said that his department is not able to control the situation in the republic.

Instability in Dagestan is strongly fueled by the acute socio-economic crisis in the grip of which the republic has found itself. Industrial production in Dagestan was largely focused on the needs of the military-industrial complex of the USSR. Dagestan's defense companies have not escaped the fate of their other Russian partners. They stand without any orders. Agriculture has lost a significant part of its potential. The republic, which was a donor to the Russian budget until 1991, " covers 90 percent of its current expenses through subsidies from it. Unemployment has become widespread. In the mountainous regions of Dagestan, it reaches 80 percent of the working population.

The sharing of the modest funds available to the republic causes discontent, which aggravates interethnic relations. The desire of the established clans not to release the most important structures of power from their sphere of control leads to gross violations of the laws of the republic, which prohibit combining membership in the State Council and the Government of the Republic, performing the functions of a deputy of the People's Assembly and engaging in entrepreneurial activities. This led to the fact that the main sectors of the republic's economy were rigidly divided between representatives of the most numerous and influential ethnic groups of Dagestan. At the 36th session of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan, held on September 30, 1998, the Chairman of the National Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan, M. M. Aliev cited the following data: only three sectors of the economy-wine and vodka, fishing, and the sale of fuel and lubricants, which are controlled by corrupt officials, would allow the republic to refuse subsidies from the center and have an independent budget.

The current political and economic elite of Dagestan shows extreme selfishness. In its rampant pursuit of personal wealth, it ignores the laws, plunders the peoples of Dagestan, uses violence, and in a situation of extreme danger to its interests, it can make a deal with extremist forces interested in separating Dagestan from Russia.

The atmosphere of legal and economic lawlessness that has developed in Dagestan in recent years has become a breeding ground for political and religious extremism. When you read M. Tagaev's acclaimed book "Our Struggle, or the Imam's insurgent army" (a criminal case was opened against the author in Dagestan in January 1998 on charges of inciting national hatred) - a manifesto of extremely extremist forces, imbued with atavistic hatred of Russia and Russians, you understand what troubles such "politicians" bring to the peoples of Dagestan.". It should be noted that this understanding is inherent in the vast majority of ordinary people in Dagestan. Its peoples highly value ties with Russia. The intelligentsia, workers, civil servants, and many law enforcement officials who find the courage to do their duty in today's difficult situation are waiting for Russia and its Government to help them restore basic order. There are healthy political forces in the republic that are interested in getting it out of the crisis and strengthening its unity with Russia.

I would like to emphasize that there is no mass base for extremism in Dagestan yet. There is an extreme estrangement between the people of the republic and the government, which has forgotten what it exists for. On this basis, a social explosion is possible, but who will lead it and manage this energy is still an open question. A tragedy for Dagestan may be the coming to power on the wave of social protest of figures representing so far unaffected political and religious extremism. But this option cannot be ruled out.

It seems that the lessons of the hot summer of ' 98 have been learned to some extent by the ruling elite of the republic. The positive reaction of the population was caused by the attempts of the authorities to start the fight against corruption. In the report "On the fight against organized crime", which was presented at the 36th session of the National Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan by the Prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan, I. V. Abramovich. Yaraliev, Interior Minister A. Magomed-tagirov, acting head of the FSB Department for Dagestan G. Ibragimov, it was reported that law enforcement agencies are considering about 20 criminal cases involving major republican officials.

In December 1998, the First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General V. Kolesnikov, at a press conference summed up the preliminary results of the work of the interdepartmental operational and investigative group to combat organized crime in Dagestan. Economic crimes, corruption, and gangs have been dealt a blow. Progress has been made in solving serious crimes and murders. The facts published by the press indicate that the republic receives assistance from the federal center in the fight for law and order.

The Dagestani knot of problems cannot be cut with one blow. It must be unraveled painstakingly, purposefully. The peoples of Dagestan expect their leadership and Moscow to take further effective measures to curb corrupt officials and organized crime, restore the economic potential of the republic, and improve their living conditions. People will follow politicians who will defend their interests, instill and strengthen hope for a way out of the difficult period of trials. Then the extremist card will be broken. Russia will retain this southern republic, which for many decades has served as a model of national peace, good neighborliness,and mutual enrichment of the unique cultures of its peoples.

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