According to the Kuchuk-Kainardzhi Peace Treaty (1774), concluded between Russia and Turkey, Azov, Taganrog, Yenikale, Kerch, Kinburn and part of the territory between the mouths of the Dnieper and the Southern Bug were ceded to Russia. The Russian navy, previously trapped in the Taganrog Bay of the Sea of Azov, was granted the right to sail on the Black Sea, but without going beyond its borders. But Russia, in fact, could not use this right, because it practically did not have a fleet on the Black Sea. The Russian government understood that Turkey, having recovered from the consequences of the war of 1768-1774 and supported by European powers, would try to regain its lost positions in the Northern Black Sea region by force.
From the Azov Flotilla, only a few small frigates could go to the Black Sea: the shallow depths of the Taganrog Bay made it difficult to build larger military vessels .1 Therefore, the Admiralty Board, which was in charge of naval affairs, paid special attention to the Kerch Bay and the Dnieper-Bug Estuary, seeing in them possible shipbuilding centers and locations for the future Black Sea Fleet.
One of the first documents that mentioned the use of the Dnieper-Bug estuary as a new fleet base was the decree of September 27, 1774. The commander of the Azov Flotilla, Admiral A. N. Senyavin, was instructed to find out the possibility of maintaining several frigates of the flotilla at the Kinburn fortress. The idea of creating a harbor with a military port and a shipyard in this estuary appeared later, when the Admiralty Board found it more profitable to build ships in the estuary than in the Don shipyards. Larger ships could be built on the estuary, suitable for sailing in the open sea. I was also attracted by the relative ease of delivery of shipbuilding materials from the forests located along the Dnieper and its tributaries. In this connection, Senyavin was instructed in 1775 to inspect the estuary and its coast and express his thoughts on the place of creating a military port, and it was indicated that "it must be taken as a decisive decision in order to have a city, harbor and a military fleet on the estuary"2 . Senyavin's inspection of the north-eastern and southern banks of the estuary, about-
1 Veselago F. F. Kratkaya istoriya russkogo flota [A brief history of the Russian Fleet]. Moscow, L. 1939, p. 106.
2 TSGAVMF USSR, f. 212, op. 4, d. 79, ll. 2-6.
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Depth measurements have shown that the Glubokaya Pristan tract meets the necessary requirements to some extent. Regarding the shipyard, Senyavin wrote that it is advisable to lay it on the Dnieper River slightly higher than the Alexander Shantz 3 fortification .
In 1775. Catherine II signed a decree setting out the provisions for the establishment of naval forces in estuary 4 . This document defined the specifics of the organization and development of shipbuilding in the South of Russia. Senyavin's proposal to build a military port in the estuary was accepted, and the shipyards - in the area of Alexandrshants, although this predetermined the use of special ship-lifting pontoons-camels for the withdrawal of large ships through the mouth of the Dnieper and thereby reduced one of the main advantages that the board counted on when planning to transfer the construction of ships from the Don shipyards to the estuary. Shipbuilding on the Sea of Azov was proposed to be reduced, leaving there "correction by repairs and the construction of small vessels." The harbor for a military port was supposed to provide safe parking for at least 20 large ships with an appropriate number of small auxiliary vessels. The limited size of the estuary and its shallow waters led to this decision: three-quarters of the total number of large ships in peacetime had to be on the stocks in a state of maximum readiness. Accordingly, the shipyard was required to have at least 15 boathouses (buildings in which the ship's hull is built) located close enough to each other for the convenience of surrounding them together with the admiralty buildings with a system of defensive fortifications.
Senyavin was instructed to start logging to ensure the start of work on estuary 5 . The forest was supposed to be harvested during the coming winter months in order to have time to test the possibility of rafting it with the spring flood through the Dnieper rapids. In February 1776, Vice-president of the Admiralty Colleges I. G. Chernyshev informed the Novorossiysk governor Prince G. A. Potemkin about the departure of the ship's master V. A. Selyaninov from St. Petersburg "to search for a place on the Dnieper under the shipyard and measure the Dnieper with his future navigators all the way to Kiev and inspect the forests"6 . General Controller S. B. Shubin, a member of the Admiralty Boards, was appointed to lead the work on the estuary, and he was supposed to "go there for a short time to start the harbor and shipyard on the Dnieper Estuary" 7 . To help him, the board appointed Brigadier I. Ilyin, a former shipwright, adviser to the quartermaster expedition, and a group of naval and army officers .8 The instructions received by the Comptroller General again referred to the joint construction of a military port, admiralty and shipyard in the area of Deep Pier 9 . Shubin was offered to build a temporary shipyard with three boathouses. He chose the site at Alexander Schantz for this purpose, explaining his choice by its close location to the estuary, the presence of fortifications and an army garrison.
In November 1777, the Admiralty Board presented a report to Catherine II, 10 in which the location of the military port, admiralty and shipyard was determined on the estuary at the Deep Pier. The Main Black Sea Board was also supposed to be located there. Regarding the shipyard at Alexander-shantz, it was stated that "the board believes that it will start a temporary shipyard until everything is built and put in order on the estuary." At the same time, it was planned to build boathouses for five ships at the temporary shipyard 11 . In May 1778, the construction of the Black Sea Fleet was transferred to Potemkin. In another decree, it was noted "that the establishment of a temporary structure of ships on the Dnieper at Alexander Shantsy E. I. V. does not find it necessary, because it would have been destroyed by itself upon reaching the intentions of the harbor and shipyard and there would have been only a vain loss of money" 12 .
But the board that advocated the creation of a military harbor and the main shipyard in the estuary)/ then I changed my mind. In the view about this, say-
3 Ibid., pp. 17-19.
4 Ibid., ll. 10-12.
5 Ibid., l. 25.
12. "Questions of hysteria" No. 8.
6 Ibid., l. 56.
7 Ibid., 8, ll. 7-15.
8 Materials for the history of the Russian Fleet, Part VI, St. Petersburg, 1877, p. 699.
9 TSGAVMF USSR, f. 212, op. 4, d. 81, ll. 373-398.
10 Ibid., pp. 360-363.
11 Аркас З. A, The beginning of the establishment of the Russian fleet on the Black Sea and its actions from 1778 to 1798. - Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities, 1860, vol. IV, p. 262.
12 Materials for the history of the Russian Fleet, Part VI, p. 710.
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elk, that "all the circumstances gathered and quite reasoning, the board decided for the convenient start of the Admiralty and shipyard at Alexander shantsy, rather than in the estuary" 13 . The reason for this decision of the board was, apparently, the fact that in the estuary depths sufficient for the descent of large ships, began quite far from the shore. And this would require the construction of boathouses to erect special embankments in shallow water, a huge amount of work on which in a deserted region would delay and increase the cost of creating a shipyard for a long time. In this situation, the final word was given to the Admiralty Board. At the same time, regardless of where this place will be assigned, it should bear the name "city of Kherson". It was one of those rare occasions when a city got a name even before the final revenge of its construction was determined. This city became the base of shipbuilding in the South of Russia.
Lieutenant-General I. A. Hannibal, a member of the Admiralty Boards, General of the Tseichmeister and Fleet, was charged with "building a new factory on the Dnieper River at the Alexander Shantz tract of the city of Kherson with proper fortifications and in it the shipyard and Admiralty" 14 . In October 1778, Hannibal began to build boathouses, for which timber was prepared along the Dnieper and in the Mogilev province. By the beginning of 1781, eight ships were planned to be built. However, an acute shortage of people who know shipbuilding work, violations of the deadlines for the supply of materials by contractors led to the fact that by the end of spring 1779, only one boathouse was ready, on which the first 60-gun ship, named "St. John's Cross", was laid on May 26. Catherine". The construction of the next two 66-gun ships was carried out from June 1780 at the Kherson shipyard. Their laying was supervised by the ship's master S. I. Afanasyev, who was transferred from the Don flotilla to the place of Selyaninov.
In 1781, a decree was issued that confirmed the de facto independence of I. A. Hannibal from the Admiralty Colleges in resolving such issues as the supply of various materials and supplies, placing orders for weapons and contracts for logging, etc., within the amount allocated for the creation of a shipyard, harbor and construction of ships. 15 The amount of this amount was to be calculated by Hannibal himself and annually submit a note on the required amount of money directly to Catherine II. Unlike the original plans, this decree predetermined the construction and maintenance in Kherson of a fleet of twelve 66-gun ships with an appropriate number of frigates, reconnaissance, messenger and transport vessels.
An obstacle to the implementation of the planned plan was an acute shortage of admiralty and naval personnel. On July 28, 1781, another four 66-gun ships were laid in Kherson. Thus, 7 ships out of 12 were under construction. The number of state-owned craftsmen, recruits and soldiers was then about 7 thousand people, and taking into account the freelance ones-10 thousand 16 . Part of the freelance craftsmen settled in Kherson. Merchants from various parts of the country and from abroad flocked here. For those who arrived for permanent residence, land was allocated free of charge within the city limits for the construction of houses and shops.
In the summer of 1782, relations between Russia and Turkey were again strained. It was clearly heading for a new war 17 . And only the Russian fleet could prevent the transfer of Turkish troops to the Crimea 18 . Admiralty boards were ordered :" From among those assigned to the structure in Kherson... 7 ships should be finished and armed, so that they can certainly be ready to be launched and used as soon as possible, but at least by next year."19 Judging by this order, St. Petersburg did not know about the true state of affairs at the Kherson shipyard. What seven ships could we be talking about, even if the first ship laid down was " Sv. Catherine" was still on the slipway, and a significant part of the ship's forest, necessary for the construction of other ships, was standing on its roots in the Dnieper forests?
At the end of 1782. Potemkin sent his prso action plan to St. Petersburg-
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 713.
15 Ibid., pp. 724, 725.
16 Druzhinina E. I. Northern Black Sea region in 1775-1800, Moscow, 1959, p. 82.
17 Tarle E. V. Catherine II and her Diplomacy. Moscow, 1945.
18 Petrov A. The Second Turkish War in the reign of Empress Catherine P. 1787-1791 St. Petersburg, 1880, p. 82.
19 Materials for the history of the Russian Fleet, Part VI, pp. 728, 729.
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unity of Crimea to Russia. In its implementation, an important role was assigned to the Black Sea Military Fleet. Arriving in the capital, Potemkin took a number of emergency measures to strengthen the Kherson Admiralty with qualified craftsmen. In the northern provinces, carpenters were hired "for the production of ship construction","of which five batches have now been sent" 20; 300 recruits were transferred from Kazan to Kherson; by the end of December, about 1,190 "artisans"were sent to the southern shipyard21 . This number also included 40 Okhten Admiralty carpenters who went with their families to live permanently in Kherson.
In January 1783, the post of commander of the Black Sea Fleet was introduced; he became a participant in the Battle of Chesma, Vice Admiral F. A. Klyuvin . His letter to I. G. Chernyshev eloquently testifies to the situation he found in Kherson: "Looking at the Admiralty and the ships under construction, which I found in a small building, especially since any rank of forests is not enough for the structure, in which neither Captain Ovtsyn 23, nor the ship's master, nor even the keepers of the parish themselves, they don't know any expense account. As a result, I saw a good number of forests scattered by the rivers in the water, of which many had completely rotted away from long lying without protection. I went to all the stores to see supplies and materials, but unexpectedly I found almost empty ones, in short, I found this port in a poor and disorderly state. " 24 The situation with the ships on the stocks was no better. On the ship " Sv. Catherine " had to change the skin because of the appearance of rot. Of the six 66-gun ships, only four were fully equipped.
In June 1783, captain of the 1st rank M. I. Voinovich was appointed captain over the port, and then captain of the 1st rank A. P. Muromtsev, who replaced Voinovich, who returned to his duties as commander of the 66-gun ship "Glory of Catherine". Launched on September 16, 1783, it actually opened the era of Russian military shipbuilding on the Black Sea. The ship laid down by the first "Sv. Catherine" was never launched: its set rotted so much that it was decided to disassemble the unfinished hull in order to use suitable parts for the construction of the frigate on another slipway 25 .
In April 1783, Crimea was incorporated into Russia. This action allowed us to start developing the Akhtiar Bay, which was chosen for the future basing of the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet. The convenient position of the bay was one of the first to draw attention to the commander of the Russian troops in the Crimea, A.V. Suvorov, on whose instructions fortifications were built on the shore of the bay26 . The unusual advantages of the bay were also noted by Klyv, who brought it to St. Petersburg: "There is no safe haven like this in the whole of Europe... you can have a fleet of up to a hundred battleships in it"27 . The beginning of the port and the city named Sevastopol was given by four stone buildings, as D. N. Senyavin, the future famous admiral, notes in his autobiographical notes. 28 Initially, it was supposed to organize the construction of ships at the new port in the same way as it was done in the Kherson Admiralty. At the end of 1784, oak forests were harvested for two battleships 29 . However, this intention was not realized due to the difficulties and high cost of delivering a large amount of necessary materials, primarily timber, to Sevastopol.
In the summer of 1783, the first crews for ships under construction arrived in Kherson from St. Petersburg. Several thousand sailors, soldiers, gunners and craftsmen of various professions were sent to the Black Sea. Divided into parties, under the supervision of naval and army officers, they moved on carts through Novgorod, Moscow, Tula to Kremenchug, and from there through the boundless and deserted steppes to Kherson. Those who arrived were placed in empty barracks.-
20 Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities, 1879, vol. XI, p. 326.
21 Ibid., p. 327.
22 Materials for the history of the Russian Fleet. Part XIII. 1890, p. 2; part XV. 1895, p. 13.
23 Ovtsyn I. T.-captain of the port of Kherson from 1780 to 1783.
24 Materials for the history of the Russian Fleet, Part XV, p. 10.
25 Ibid., p. 30.
26 A. V. Suvorov. Documents, vol. 2, Moscow, 1951, p. 69.
27 TSGAVMF USSR, f. 172, op. 1, d. 37, l. 11.
28 Golovachev V. F. Istoriya Sevastopolya kak russkogo porta [History of Sevastopol as a Russian port]. St. Petersburg, 1872; TSGAVMF USSR, f. 315, op. 1, d. 443, l. 22; see also: Venyukova S. V. From the history of Sevastopol.
29 Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities, 1879, vol. XI, p. 366.
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May regiments, some of which were withdrawn to field camps 30 . Among the officers sent from the Baltic Fleet was the captain of the 2nd rank F. F. Ushakov, who was appointed commander on one of the 66-gun ships 31 .
The need for experienced craftsmen at the Kherson shipyard and the lack of some human resources in the northern provinces prompted Potemkin to entrust the Moscow governor N. P. Arkharov with the hiring of 1,200 carpenters, the first shipments of which left Moscow in July. At the same time, Tula was recruiting blacksmiths for the Kherson Admiralty .32 The plague, brought to Kherson from Constantinople, claimed many hundreds of lives during the summer and autumn of 1783 and suspended work at the Admiralty for several months. Vice Admiral F. A. Klyov also died. Vice Admiral Y. F. Sukhotin was appointed the new commander of the Black Sea Fleet.
The summer of 1784 was spent worrying about the completion and preparation for the launch of the second 66-gun ship, named " Sv. Paul", and armament "Glory of Catherine". Her arrival on the roadstead to Ochakov, where the ship was rigged, loaded with ballast and artillery was installed, made a great impression on the Turks, who could not believe that the Russians managed to drag such a huge mass over the Estuary shoals. The first battleship "Slava Yekaterina" joined the Black Sea Fleet in August. In 1785, the states of the Admiralty and navy on the Black Sea were approved. The Black Sea Fleet was to consist of two 80-gun ships and ten 66-gun ships, as well as eight 50-gun, six 32-gun and six 22-gun frigates, 5 combat schooners and 23 transport vessels .33 The personnel of the fleet was determined at 13,500 people.
The de facto independence of shipbuilding and the Black Sea Fleet was also legalized. To manage all naval affairs, the Black Sea Admiralty Board was organized. Shipbuilding at the Azov shipyards was transferred to the same board34 . It was headed by a 30-year-old captain of the 1st rank "officer of excellent knowledge in maritime affairs" N. S. Mordvinov35 . The son of the famous Russian Admiral S. I. Mordvinov, who served for several years as a volunteer in the British Navy, and then commanded battleships in the Baltic, N. S. Mordvinov was an educated, energetic and ambitious man.
The formation of the Black Sea Admiralty Board had a positive impact on the construction of the fleet. The separation of the board from the Admiralty Boards allowed it, depending on specific local circumstances, to allocate financial and material resources allocated by the government for the creation of a fleet and the development of a shipbuilding base on the Black Sea. The independence of the Black Sea government from the Admiralty Colleges and Potemkin's influence at court made it possible to abandon the construction of 66-gun ships of the Baltic model and go on to search for a type of ship that would meet the specific conditions of the closed Black Sea military theater. The ship's master S. I. Afanasyev developed ship designs that were distinguished by a number of progressive design innovations, informing Potemkin about this, who showed a keen interest in everything related to the fleet .36
Meanwhile, Turkey did not want to put up with the loss of Crimea and the appearance of the Russian navy on the Black Sea. The war with Russia was instigated by Britain and France, who did not want to strengthen Russia on the Black Sea. In August 1787, Turkey began military operations. By this time, the fleet had received four 37 66-gun ships and two 50-gun frigates from the Kherson Shipyard. In addition, the 80 - gun ship "Joseph II" was completed in Kherson, and the 66-gun ship " Sv. Vladimir" and the 50-gun frigate "St. Alexander".
30 Plenipotentiary I. A. My family and origin. - Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities, 1889, vol. XV, p. 690.
31 Skalovsky R. The Life of Admiral F. F. Ushakov, Part I. St. Petersburg, 1856, p. 41.
32 Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities, 1879, vol. XI, pp. 335-336.
33 Shershov A. P. K istorii voennogo korablestroeniya [On the history of military shipbuilding], Moscow, 1952, p. 288. - Marine Collection, 1911, N 4, Unofficial section, p. 6.
34 Skalovsky R. Uk. soch., p. 173.
35 Archive of the Mordvinovs, T. I. St. Petersburg, 1901, pp. 368-371.
36 Davydov Yu. V. Senyavin, Moscow, 1972, p. 31.
37 The ship "St. Alexander" crashed near Yevpatoria on October 23, 1786, while crossing from Kherson to Sevastopol.
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Although the war was not unexpected, it found the Black Sea Administration insufficiently prepared to support the fleet's operations in combat conditions. This was due to a number of reasons, the main of which was a chronic shortage of payment resources. All the mistakes and omissions in the work of the board and its services, which were not so acutely felt in peacetime, were reflected with the beginning of the war. In justification of the accusations against the government by Potemkin, who was dissatisfied with the failures of the autumn military campaign of 1787 and the continuous flow of reports and letters about the lack or lack of things necessary for the fleet, N. S. Mordvinov wrote: "Be fair - we had no ways to pay everything. The board took care of everything; it made its own representations, demanded money... The Sevastopol Fleet was to be repaired, provided for wartime, and carried out work in various places: and everywhere it was three times more expensive than in ordinary times... Now we owe more than 900 thousand. As a debt, I want you to know that if you don't send us two million dollars, you will pay us four million dollars when we miss the summer, the time when all goods are cheaper and transportation costs three or four times less."38
Part of the blame for the Admiralty's poor preparation for the hardships of war falls on the board's employees, who took advantage of every opportunity for personal enrichment. Complaining in a letter to V. S. Popov about the low salary and, as a result, lack of interest in the conscientious work of his subordinates, Mordvinov proposed to double the salary of all Admiralty ranks .39 Considering the style of work of the Black Sea government to be the cause of many evils, Potemkin, in order to subordinate the work of the board to wartime tasks, decided to direct its activities himself, effectively removing Mordvinov from management. However, this did not improve the situation in the Admiralty. Difficulties in supplying the fleet increased, and the debts of the Admiralty board increased. Potemkin wrote an angry letter to Mordvinov: "I will tell you frankly that in all the actions of the government there is more form than deeds... There are two ways of doing things: one, where everything possible is turned to advantage and different ways are invented to correct shortcomings; here, according to the proverb, the awl shaves; the other, where the method is more useful; it burdens everywhere and puts obstacles to diligence. " 40
The conflict between Potemkin and Mordvinov led to the fact that in December 1788, the latter sent a letter to Potemkin asking him to be released from service. His place was taken by Rear Admiral M. I. Voinovich, the next most senior officer of the Black Sea Fleet after Mordvinov. Potemkin, without breaking the chain of command, actually removed the cautious counter - admiral from direct command of the ship's squadron-the main strike force of the fleet. It was no secret that the only major battle with the Turkish fleet at that time (at Fidonisi Island) was won by the Russian squadron thanks to the decisive actions of the squadron's junior flagship, Captain of the brigadier rank F. F. Ushakov, who, after Voinovich left for Kherson, became, by virtue of the seniority regulations, the squadron commander and the Sevastopol port 41 .
The financial difficulties faced by the Black Sea Government since the beginning of the war forced it at first to abandon the laying of new large ships. The inconvenient position of the Kherson shipyard for their construction prompted Potemkin to pay attention to the Bug Estuary, whose depths were larger and allowed ships to be taken out to sea without additional effort. The capture of Ochakov by Russian troops in December 1788 opened an exit from the estuary to the sea, and the Sevastopol squadron was reinforced by two battleships and a frigate located in the estuary. For the same purpose, the 66-gun ship "Epiphany of the Lord" was laid down at the Kherson Shipyard in March 1789 and the construction of the 44-gun frigate "Navarchia"began. A slightly larger frigate was laid down in January 1790 at a new shipyard at the mouth of the Ingul River, called the city of Nikolaev .42 These frigates were the first ships designed by the Afa-
38 TsGIA USSR, f. 994, op. 2, d. 16, ll. 10, 11.
39 Ibid., ll. 1, 2.
40 Papers in the book by G. A. Potemkin-Tavrichesky. - Collection of military-historical materials, St. Petersburg, 1894, vol. VII, N 56.
41 Bolgari P., Zotkin N. et al. Chernomorskiy flot [Black Sea Fleet], Moscow, 1967, p. 15.
42 Notes of the Odessa Society of History and Antiquities, 1860, vol. II, p. 672.
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nasyev, based on the specifics of the fleet's combat service in the Black Sea.
An analysis of the activities of the Black Sea Government in 1789-1790 shows that the Chief Quartermaster S. I. Afanasyev becomes the main person in the Black Sea Government at this time, and the commander of the Black Sea Fleet Voinovich is given a secondary place. Satisfied with the successful activities of Afanasyev in the Black Sea Board and Ushakov in the command of the fleet, Potemkin in March 1790 signed an order to the Black Sea Board: "Assuming personal command of the Black Sea Fleet, I appointed G. Rear Admiral and Cavalier Ushakov to command under me. G. Rear Admiral and cavalier Count Voinovich was assigned to the command of the Caspian sea forces... And as Mr. Brigadier Afanasyev remains the senior member of the board, it is particularly important for him to take care of the speedy execution of all my instructions. " 43 The warrant addressed to Ushakov read in part:"Without burdening you with the board of the Admiralty, I entrust you with the command of the fleet for military use." 44
These changes in the management of naval forces were very timely. This is confirmed by the battle won on July 8 by Ushakov's squadron near the Kerch Strait, which resulted in the planned landing of Turkish troops in the Crimea, and Ushakov's defeat of the Turkish fleet in a two-day battle in the area between Tendra and Hajibey. In January 1791. Potemkin formally put Ushakov at the head of the Black Sea government. Having learned about the appointment, the rear admiral in a letter to Afanasyev noted: "As I owe many necessary needs in the reasoning of wartime to be constantly with the fleet, and I hope that very rarely, and even then only for the shortest time, I can accidentally be in Kherson, so please, my dear sir, according to the Black Sea Admiralty Board, everything is fine. due diligence " 45 . Thus, the actual distribution of responsibilities remained the same as before Ushakov's appointment.
The Russo-Turkish War ended with another brilliant victory for the Black Sea Fleet: on July 31, 1791. at Cape Kaliakria, a Russian squadron under the command of Ushakov defeated the larger and superior firepower of the Turkish fleet.
In the spring of 1791. Potemkin, based on the experience of the war, developed a program for the further development of the fleet and shipbuilding in the Black Sea, the implementation of which was scheduled for the coming years .46 This program covered all aspects of naval and admiralty activities: from the number and type of ships of various ranks to the supply of the latest English and French books on shipbuilding planned for the opening of the school of ship architecture. However, Potemkin failed to implement these plans. On October 5, 1791, he died on the way from Yass to Nikolayev. Temporary command of the Southern Army and the Black Sea Fleet passed to General-in-Chief M. V. Kakhovsky .
Thus ended the initial period of creation of the Black Sea Fleet. The organization of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea was based on the human and material resources of the northern and central regions of the country. Moving some of the qualified personnel from traditional shipbuilding centers to the south, as well as the staff of the Baltic Fleet, made it possible to create a shipbuilding base and the core of a combat-ready fleet in the shortest possible time, and without attracting foreign specialists. A set of organizational measures to create a single body - the Black Sea Government-had a positive impact on the further development and strengthening of the Russian naval forces in the south, and the feasibility of transformation was confirmed in the success of the young Black Sea Fleet during the Russo - Turkish war of 1787-1791, when Ushakov developed and applied a new, progressive tactic of conducting naval battles.
43 Admiral Ushakov. Documents, vol. 1, Moscow, 1951, p. 117
44 Ibid., p. 118.
45 Ibid., p. 454.
46 Archive of the Mordvinovs, pp. 503-509.
47 Papers of the book by G. A. Potemkin-Tavrichesky. - Collection of military-historical materials, St. Petersburg, 1894, issue VIII, p. 261.
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